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RECENT DECISIONS
property implied that the restrictions were to continue in effect as to
loans secured by personalty. This contention the Court renounced,
noting that the early cases made no distinction between real and
chattel mortgages and that the restrictions had therefore never ap-
plied. The Court also noted that the recent unsuccessful legislative
attempt to validate unsecured loans 21 impelled an implication that
the legislature presupposed the validity of loans secured by chattel
mortgages by its failure to provide for them in the bill. The Court
then held that the proscriptions of the "Restraining Acts" do not ex-
tend to chattel mortgages executed to secure a discounted loan and
that both the mortgage and the notes are valid and enforceable.
The problem of the unsecured discounted loan still remains. The
legislature attempted to remove all restrictions during its 1957 ses-
sion.2 2 However, the Governor vetoed the bills.23 Lending by cor-
porations is not prohibited. These loans do not compete with but,
rather, supplement the lending function of the banks. Nor do they
inflate currency by creating deposits. The only apparent difficulty
remaining is a lack of protection against possible abuses. Therefore,
a modification of the statutory scheme from prohibition to regulation
would appear desirable.
M
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ADmINISTRATIVE LAW - DELEGATION
OF POWERS - PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW SECTION 553 (5) HELD
VALID DESPITE ABSENCE OF EXPRESSED STANDARDS LIMITING
DISCRETION.- The defendant, while driving through the Brooklyn
Battery Tunnel, violated a traffic rule' promulgated by the Tribor-
ough Bridge and Tunnel Authority. Section 553(5) of the Public
Authorities Law 2 gives to the Authority the power to make rules,
subject to agreements with bondholders, for the use of their projects.
21 See A. Int. No. 4037, S. Int. No. 1952; A. Int. No. 4045, S. Int. No. 1954.
22 Ibid.
23 The Governor vetoed the bills, expressing a fear that, in the haste of the
closing days of the session, the legislators may have failed to appreciate the
full effect of the bills in their removal of such transactions from their tradi-
tional restriction to the banking realm and its consequent supervision. He also
criticized the retroactive provision of the bills which Would validate transac-
tions declared by the Court of Appeals to have been illegal when they were
consummated. Veto Message, McKINNEY'S SESSION LAWS OF NEW YORE
1991 (1957).
' The defendant failed to comply with hand and voice signals, a violation
of the RULES FOR THE REGULATION AND USE OF THE PROjEcT, art. 4, § 3.
2... [T]o make by-laws for the management and regulations of its affairs,
and subject to agreements with bondholders, rules for the regulation of the
use of the project and the establishment and collection of tolls thereon."
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It also provides that violation of these rules will be a misdemeanor.3
Special Sessions sustained a demurrer to the information, and ruled
that the statute allowed an unknown, unnamed group, to wit, the
bondholders, to decide what acts were to be crimes. The Appellate
Division, in reversing, held the delegation valid and reasoned that the
term "subject to the agreement of bondholders" referred only to finan-
cial requirements to secure their investments. Furthermore, although
no standards limiting the agency's discretion to make rules appeared
in the statute, it was sufficiently curtailed by an implied limitation of
reasonableness. People v. Malmud, 4 A.D.2d 681, 164 N.Y.S.2d
993 (2d Dep't 1957).
Article 3, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution vests
the legislative power in the Senate and the Assembly.4 The maxim,
delegata potestas non potest delegari, represents the proposition that
this power may neither be re-delegated nor abandoned.5 In addition,
the legislature possesses administrative power which may be re-
delegated to authorized public agencies.6 The legislature may dele-
gate to administrative officials the power to determine facts and con-
ditions upon which the operation of a statute depends. They must
not, however, delegate the power to make law.
7
The line between what is a legislative and what is an adminis-
trative function is often thin. Thus in People v. Ryan 8 and People
v. Grant 9 the courts struck down penal sanctions made pursuant to
the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law of 1933.10 The Board was em-
powered to make rules governing the sale of liquor." The statute
provided that violations of these rules would be crimes, "if the rule
so provides." 12 The Administrator was thus empowered to assign
3 PUBLIC AUTHORITEs LAW § 553(5). "Violation of such rules shall be a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not exceeding fifty dollars or by im-
prisonment for not longer than thirty days, or both." Ibid.
4 This provision is similar to article one, section one, of the Federal Con-
stitution, and similar legal principles apply. Compare Noyes v. Erie & Wyoming
Farmers Co-op., 170 Misc. 42, 10 N.Y.S.2d 114 (Sup. Ct.), af'd, 281 N.Y.
187, 22 N.E.2d 334 (1939), with Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388
(1935).
s For an informative article on the origin, development and its adaptability
as an American Constitutional doctrine, see Duff and Whiteside, Delegata
potestas non potest delegari: a maxim of American Constitutional law, 14 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 168 (1929).
6 See Darweger v. Staats, 267 N.Y. 290, 196 N.E. 61 (1935).
7 People v. Ryan, 267 N.Y. 133, 195 N.E. 822 (1935); People v. Grant,
242 App. Div. 310, 275 N.Y. Supp. 74 (3d Dep't 1934), aff'd iner., 267 N.Y.
508, 196 N.E. 553 (1935).
8 267 N.Y. 133, 195 N.E. 822 (1935).
9242 App. Div. 310, 275 N.Y. Supp. 74 (3d Dep't 1934), aff'd neie., 267
N.Y. 508, 196 N.E. 553 (1935).
10 Laws of N.Y. 1933, c. 180 (later repealed by Laws of N.Y. 1934, c. 478,
ALCO. BEV. CONTROL LAW).
11 Laws of N.Y. 1933, c. 180, §§ 17(7), 89, as amended, Laws of N.Y. 1933,
c. 819.
12 Id. § 97(4).
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to some of his rules the force of law and to deny it to others. It was
the Board, in its discretion, and not the legislature that decided what
acts were crimes. This was an unconstitutional attempt to delegate
the law-making power to an administrative body.
But, of course, where the legislature makes a law, it may grant
to administrative officers the power to formulate rules for its admin-
istration. 13 And where the legislature provides that violations of
these rules will be a crime, this does not elevate the character of the
delegated powers from an administrative to a legislative level. 14 What
is forbidden is the conferment of the power to make law, which neces-
sarily involves discretion as to what it shall be; what is permissible
is the delegation of a discretion in the law's execution to be exercised
under, and pursuant to, that law. 15
Thus, if the rules promulgated by the Authority in the Mahnud
case were subject to the approval of the bondholders, they too would
be deciding what actions are criminal. However, in upholding the
delegation, the Court rejected the contention that "subject to the agree-
ment of," was synonymous with "subject to the approval of," the
bondholders. In other words, the bondholders were powerless in re-
gard to penal sanctions. In this respect, the delegation of power in
the instant case was valid. It conferred discretion on the Board to
make the rules, but it was the legislature that made violations of these
rules criminal.
The legislative function is performed, in its constitutional sense,
therefore, when the legislature sets down the policy to be effectuated,
identifies who may carry it out, and defines the scope of his authority.'6
The delegation of a certain discretionary power to fill in details upon
which the operation of the statute depends is an ordinary and legiti-
mate function of the legislature.1 7 But such discretion must take the
form of permissible administrative behavior within prescribed limits.
Courts have insisted that there be no unbridled grant of discre-
tion' s and have invalidated such grants as an abuse of the power to
delegate. 19 Section 553(5) of the Public Authorities Law contains
no express standard to canalize the discretion it confers. The Appel-
13United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
14 Ibid.; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1906) ; Darweger
v. Staats, 267 N.Y. 290, 196 N.E. 61 (1935).
Is See People v. Ryan, 267 N.Y. 133, 195 N.E. 822 (1935); Thomas v.
Board of Standards & Appeals, 263 App. Div. 352, 359, 33 N.Y.S.2d 219, 226(2d Dep't), rev'd on other grounds, 290 N.Y. 109, 48 N.E.2d 284 (1942);
People v. Grant, 242 App. Div. 310, 275 N.Y. Supp. 74 (3d Dep't 1934).
16 Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 514-15 (1944); Opp Cotton Mills,
Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941); Tropp v. Knickerbocker Village,
Inc., 122 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
27 Ibid.Is See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
19 Ibid. See also Small v. Moss, 279 N.Y. 288. 299, 18 N.E.2d 281, 284(1938).
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late Division supplied the standard omitted by the legislature. They
held that the "implied limitation of reasonableness" 20 was a sufficient
restriction. This conflicts with precedent which insists that the legis-
lature promulgate a standard in order to determine whether or not
the Administrator is acting ultra vires.21 This is a necessary corollary
of the rule that courts may not invade the field of discretion conferred
by law upon an administrative officer. 22  Nor may the courts usurp
the legislative function of creating a standard.2 3  Of course, necessity
may demand that the legislature set standards in general terms,24 but
these must be capable of reasonable application or the grant is invalid.2 5
Thus, the question is not merely are the rules reasonable; but simply
are they part of a valid grant. The "implied limitation of reasonable-
ness" does not meet such a test.
M
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL LAW - CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION PERMITTING WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL IN FELONY CASES
HELD SELF-EXECUTING. - Defendant, indicted for grand larceny,
20 People v. Malmud, 4 A.D.2d 681, 164 N.Y.S.2d 204 (2d Dep't 1957).
21 See, e.g., Hampton Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Wichita
R.R. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48 (1922); United States v. Grimaud,
220 U.S. 506 (1911) ; Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) ; Noyes v. Erie &
Wyoming Farmers Co-op., 170 Misc. 42, 10 N.Y.S.2d 114 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
281 N.Y. 187, 22 N.E.2d 334 (1939) ; New York Good Humor, Inc. v. Morgan,
171 Misc. 899, 14 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
22 Small v. Moss, 279 N.Y. 288, 299, 18 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1938) (dictum).
.. [T]o prevent its being a pure delegation of legislative power, [the
legislature] must enjoin upon it a certain course of procedure and certain rules
of decision in the performance of its function. It is a wholesome and necessary
principle that such an agency must pursue the procedure and rules enjoined and
show substantial compliance therewith to give validity to its action." Wichita
R.R. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 58 (1922) (emphasis added).
23 "We [the courts] do not read the limits on any powers." Small v. Moss,
279 N.Y. 288, 299, 18 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1938).
24 See, e.g., Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (authority
to fix prices only- when they have risen or threaten to rise to an extent or in a
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the act) ; Field v. Clark, note 21 supra
(authority to suspend tariffs on administrative finding that the duties imposed
by a foreign state are unequal and unreasonable) ; New York Cent. Securities
Co. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932) (the power to approve con-
solidations in the public interest) ; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190 (1943) (the power to regulate radio stations engaged in chain
broadcasting as public interest, convenience, or necessity requires) ; Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Keppel & Bro's, 291 U.S. 304 (1933) (the power to prohibit
unfair methods of competition).
25 Small v. Moss, 279 N.Y. 288, 299, 18 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1938) (dictum);
Little v. Young, 274 App. Div. 1005, 85 N.Y.S.2d 41 (2d Dep't 1948) (per
curiam) ; cf. Yakus v. United States. 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Opp Cotton Mills,
Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941).
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